International Journal of Aviation,
Aeronautics, and Aerospace
Volume 2

Issue 4

Article 4

10-16-2015

Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?
Simon A. Bennett
University of Leicester, sab22@le.ac.uk

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa
Part of the Science and Technology Studies Commons

Scholarly Commons Citation
Bennett, S. A. (2015). Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?. International Journal of
Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, 2(4). https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace by an authorized
administrator of Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

In recent years the systems-thinking approach to safety management and
accident investigation has gained traction with risk managers and those
international bodies responsible for aviation safety (International Civil Aviation
Organisation, 1995, 2013; Reason, 1990, 2008, 2013; Tochen & Tobin, 2013;
Shorrock, Leonhardt, Licu & Peters, 2014). Watershed moments included:
The 1992 publication of The Honourable Mr Justice Virgil P.
Moshansky’s systems-thinking-informed analysis of the 1989 Dryden
accident, in which wing ice brought down a Fokker F-28 passenger
aircraft
The 2009 publication of Mr Charles Haddon-Cave QC’s holistic
analysis of the loss over Afghanistan of RAF Nimrod MR2 XV230
(Haddon-Cave, 2009), where a venerable airframe compromised by
reactive patching (see Weir (1996) for a definition), and safety migration
(see Rasmussen (1997) and Reason (1997) for definitions), was lost to
an in-flight fire.
This paper has two objectives. First, to present a systems-thinkinginformed analysis of the loss on 17 July, 2014, of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing
777-200 (Flight MH17) over Hrabove, Ukraine (Dutch Safety Board, 2014,
2015a, 2015b). Secondly, to investigate the degree to which subsequent political
and press reaction drew on the systems-thinking-informed approach to accident
investigation.
Theoretical basis
Systems-thinking takes in the interactive complexity, non-linear
interactions and emergent behaviours of socio-technical systems (Dorner, 1996;
Maurino, Reason, Johnston & Lee, 1998; Hollnagel, 2004; Johnson, 2005;
Dekker, 2006; Black & Koopman, 2009; Miller, 2009; Shorrock, Leonhardt,
Licu & Peters, 2014; Griffin, Young & Stanton, 2015). It focuses on the systemas-found and describes the 'lived reality' of the system in question. Systems do
not always behave as expected. Non-linear interactions, where small inputs
generate unexpectedly large outputs, or where large inputs generate
unexpectedly small outputs, or where, through time, identical inputs generate
qualitatively different outputs, render system behaviour unpredictable: "In
complex systems, outcomes are often emergent, and not simply a result of the
performance of individual system components. Hence system behaviour is hard
to understand and often not as expected” (Shorrock, Leonhardt, Licu & Peters,
2014, p. 3).
According to Miller (2009), risk is a product of interactions at the
systemic level. Hollnagel’s (2004, p. xv) systems work leads him to conclude
that "... accidents [should be] seen as emerging phenomena in complex systems
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... the result of an aggregation of conditions ... ". Dekker (2006, p. 78) observes:
"[I]t is critical to capture the relational dynamics and longer-term socioorganisational trends behind system failure". Turner (1978; 1994) argues that
disasters incubate over time. “[A] multiplicity of minor causes, misperceptions,
misunderstandings and miscommunications accumulate unnoticed during [the]
incubation period….ready to contribute to a major failure” says Turner (1994,
p. 216).
Actor-network theory’s (ANT’s) ‘principle of generalised symmetry’
transforms our understanding of the ‘social’. It posits that all system
components (animate or inanimate, tangible or intangible) have agency and act.
In ANT’s conception, the social is ‘materially heterogeneous’. Socio-technical
systems are purposeful, bounded assemblies of mutually-affecting animate and
inanimate actants (philosophies, policies, laws, rules, computer software,
blueprints, components, devices, machines, engineering tolerances, corporate
financing arrangements, plant operators, shop stewards, managers, training
plans, beliefs, practices, cultures, aspirations, prejudices, etc.) (Callon & Latour,
1981; Callon, 1991; Callon & Law, 1997; Risan, 1997). Actor-network theory
reveals “how things are ‘stitched together’ across divisions and distinctions”
(Murdoch, 1997, p. 321) to create goal-oriented systems (‘hybrid-collectifs’) .
Purposeful systems (like that designed to deliver air service across international
boundaries) emerge from a process of ‘heterogeneous engineering’, whereby
human and non-human elements (‘actants’) are enrolled/co-opted (‘translated’).
Like all analytical devices, actor-network theory is not without its
problems. There are arguments over ANT's treatment of social phenomena like
power, gender, race and intentionality. Factors like these are either 'flattened' or
backgrounded by the methodology. In the context of the analysis presented here,
the most obvious difficulty is deciding the size and geometry (topography) of
the aviation system network space - that purposeful assemblage of actants that
delivers air service. Where does one draw one's analytical horizon? Where is
the system boundary? The more restrictive one's survey, the greater the risk that
key actants may be overlooked. The more generous, the greater the risk that the
resulting picture fails to add anything of significance to one's understanding.
The author reflexively acknowledges that his conceptualisation of the aviation
system network space (and the resulting systems-thinking-informed analysis)
may be considered too broad by some, and too narrow by others. Regardless of
this problem, the author contends that actor-network theory makes an important
contribution to our understanding of the origins of the MH17 shoot-down by
suggesting that the disaster, rather than being a 'bolt from the blue', was in some
degree socially produced. Acknowledging the systemic origins of disaster helps
us develop effective responses (like institutional reforms or rule changes).
Interventions that modify precepts and cultures may prove especially effective
at preventing repeats.
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This analysis assumes the ‘aviation system’ – a goal-oriented network
of mutually affecting actants – to contain the following elements:
Table 1.
The aviation system network-space – an actor-network theory-informed (ANTinformed) conceptualisation.
The aviation system network-space
National governments
National regulatory authorities (e.g. Federal Aviation Administration)
Supra-national regulatory authorities (e.g. International Civil Aviation
Organisation, European Aviation Safety Agency, Eurocontrol)
Representative bodies (e.g. The International Airline Passengers Association,
European Cockpit Association, International Air Transport Association, The
European Low Fares Airline Association)
Aircraft manufacturers
Airport authorities
Products (e.g. aircraft, flight service, loyalty schemes)
Passenger agendas and expectations
Investor and shareholder agendas and expectations
Airline employee behaviour (e.g. adaptability, flexibility, loyalty,
commitment, integrity)
Airline and aviation infrastructure financing terms-and-conditions
Regulatory authorities’ risk perceptions
Airlines’ risk perceptions
Passengers’ risk perceptions
The airline cost base (e.g. the price of fuel, landing charges, salary costs,
maintenance costs, in-flight catering costs, advertising costs, interest rates,
etc.)
Inter-airline competition
Near-misses, incidents and accidents (like the De Havilland Comet disasters
of the 1950s)
Media representations of the industry (e.g. safety, value for money,
attractiveness when compared to other modes of transport like high-speed
rail)

Reductionism is the antithesis of systems-thinking. Unlike systemsthinking, reductionism settles for simplistic explanations. Failure is linked to
discrete actions (like a flight crew’s decision not to de-ice). The desire or,
according to Horlick-Jones (1996, p. 66), “need” to blame, encourages
reductionist analyses. Post-disaster reductionist analyses support blamism. In
the aftermath of disaster, blamism and reductionism often become locked in a
non-virtuous, unedifying dance. By individuating responsibility for failure,
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blamism denies the contribution of wider societal and organisational factors like
political
self-interest,
bureaucratic
incompetence,
under-funding,
indoctrination, poor training and unrealistic deadlines. Blaming produces a
‘fundamental attribution error’ (Fiske & Taylor, 1984).
Analyses that settle for simple, reductionist answers to complex
questions both represent and create latent errors:
Example 1: The reductionist tendency to blame the 2014 ebola outbreak
on Africa's 'backwardness' meant that other factors, like the
impoverishment of that continent by Britain, France, Belgium,
Germany, China and other powerful, self-interested nations went
undiscussed. In the case of the ebola outbreak, reductionism led to
victim-blaming. Bennett (2014b) observed: "Seen in the context of
global power-plays between countries like Britain, China, Russia and
the United States, the ebola crisis is less a product of Sierra Leone,
Liberia and Guinea's under-development and associated social,
economic and political problems than of developed countries' greed and
ambition. Seen though a systems-thinking lens, ebola is fundamentally
a crisis of developed nations' exploitative behaviour. Ebola is a crisis of
ideology".
Example 2: The reductionist tendency to blame US shootings on the
perpetrators alone means that other salient factors, like the ease with
which weapons can be purchased or the possible impact on behaviour of
violent gameplay, go unchallenged. Analysing the case of Veronica
Rutledge, the Walmart shopper slain by her infant son, Bennett (2015a)
observed: “Viewed through a systems-thinking lens, US gun violence is
primarily a social problem rooted in the belief that every citizen 'has the
right to keep and bear arms'. Veronica Rutledge wasn't killed by her son.
She was killed by the Second Amendment to the United States
Constitution”.
To summarise, systems-thinking, expressed in theories like ANT, is
counter-reductionist. It examines the impact of contextual factors on decisionmaking and behaviour. It reveals the often complex and messy origins of failure.
In so doing it rejects blamism – a morally dubious and unedifying indulgence
(Browning & Shetler, 1992; Reason & Hobbs, 2003; Jeffcott, Pidgeon, Weyman
& Walls, 2006; Woods, Dekker, Cook, Johannesen & Sarter, 2010). Reason and
Hobbs (2003, p. 97) comment: “Blaming people for their errors is emotionally
satisfying but remedially useless. Moral judgments are only appropriate when
the actions go as intended and the intention is reprehensible. Blame and
punishment make no sense at all when the intention is a good one, but the
actions do not go as planned”.
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This paper presents a systems-thinking-informed analysis of the loss on
17 July, 2014, of a Malaysia Airlines Boeing 777-200 (Flight MH17) during a
regional conflict that saw western-backed Ukrainian forces fighting Russianbacked Ukrainian separatists. Malaysia's 777 was probably destroyed by a
surface-to-air missile (SAM). The conflict in eastern Ukraine, which intensified
following Russia's annexation of the Crimea, was in some respects a proxy-war
(see Ambrose (1985) for a definition of ‘proxy-war’) between Europe and
Russia. The analysis presented here is deductive and inductive:
It uses systems theory (specifically the ANT iteration) to demonstrate
that MH17's destruction originated in a range of socio-political and
organisational factors
It treats the loss as a learning opportunity. For example, lessons are
drawn from the political and journalistic reaction to MH17's shoot-down
(an unedifying mélange of unsupported claim and counter-claim).
The MH17 disaster
Introduction
According to the Dutch Safety Board (2015a, p. 9): “The in-flight
disintegration of the aeroplane … was the result of the detonation of a warhead.
The detonation occurred above the left-hand side of the cockpit. The weapon
used was a 9N314M-model warhead carried on the 9M38-series [NATO
designation SA-11 Gadfly series] of missiles, as installed on the BUK surfaceto-air missile system”. Shrapnel ejected by the SA-11 Gadfly killed the flightcrew. The subsequent explosive decompression and disintegration of the 777
killed everyone else on board (Dutch Safety Board, 2015a). Both Ukraine and
Russia operated the SA-11 Gadfly surface-to-air (SAM) missile. The SA-11 can
carry a 70kg high explosive (HE) fragmentation warhead to 72,000 feet (22,000
metres) (Jane's Publishing, 2011). At the moment of its destruction, the aircraft
was flying at 33,000 feet (10,000 metres), 3.6 nautical miles north of airway
L980's centreline. A fragmentation warhead ejects shrapnel (metal spheres,
cubes or rods). The thin, pressurised skin of an aircraft offers no resistance to
shrapnel.
At the time of MH17’s destruction, relations between Ukraine (and its
European allies) and Russia were at a low ebb (Kuchins, 2015; Greene, 2015;
Usborne, 2015). There was fighting on the ground and a war of words in the
media. Sanctions, travel bans, import bans, asset freezes and other economic
weapons had been deployed. There were fears of a new Cold War (Deutsche
Welle, 2014; Levgold, 2014) and of a new Russian tactic – ‘hybrid warfare’
(Blair, 2015). A survey conducted in late 2014 (Levada Centre, 2014) confirmed
a sharp difference of opinion between Ukrainian and Russian respondents over
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the future of the disputed Donbass region of eastern Ukraine (sometimes
referred to by Ukrainian separatists and Russians as Novorossiya). Russian
President Vladimir Putin constructed the February, 2014 ousting of President
Viktor Yanukovych as a fascist insurrection (thereby invoking the spirit of the
USSR's 1941-1945 Great Patriotic War against Nazi Germany) (Blair, 2015).
Kiev's pro-Western lobby constructed the ousting of their fourth president as a
blow against a self-interested, interfering, backward-looking Russia. Social and
political schism and armed conflict (Levada Centre, 2014; Gregory, 2014;
Wintour & Doherty, 2014; Blair, 2015; Kuchins, 2015) formed the backcloth to
the destruction of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. Since MH17’s destruction,
East-West relations have deteriorated further, with Russia withdrawing from the
Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty, the US deploying additional
assets to NATO member states (BBC, 2015) and Syrian-based Russian
warplanes bombing anti-Assad insurrectionists (some of whom had been armed
and trained by the West) (Greene, 2015).
MH17 through a systems-thinking lens
Seen through the actor-network theory (ANT) lens, the MH17 disaster
originated in history, politics, ethnic division, a regional war, risk
miscalculation, denialism and interactions between the elements that comprise
the commercial aviation system. Circumstance, as much as the person who
pressed the button that launched the missile(s), destroyed the aircraft. The
following actants contributed to the disaster (this is far from an exhaustive list):
-

-

-

Russian leaders' distrust of the West (forged in the 1941-1945 Great
Patriotic War and tempered in the 1947-1991 Cold War, this distrust is
deep-rooted). By 2015 relations between Russia and the western powers
were problematic (Kuchins, 2015; Greene, 2015; Usborne, 2015)
The Ukrainian Parliament's (Verkhovna Rada's) 2014 decision to
abolish the 2012 law on state language policy. The 2012 law allowed
Ukraine's regions to designate languages other than Ukrainian as
'official' if they were spoken by over 10 percent of the local population.
Following enactment of the 2012 law, thirteen out of Ukraine’s 27
regions (most of them in the east of the country) adopted Russian as a
second official language. Verkhovna Rada's 2014 decision drew
significant criticism from Western politicians
Russian President Vladimir Putin’s determination to embrace the 25million-strong Russian diaspora, the ‘russki mir’ (Garton-Ash, 2014)
The incommensurate world-views and aspirations of western-facing
Ukrainians (who sparked the Euromaidan insurrection of November
2013) and eastern-facing, Russian-speaking rebels
The Euromaidan perception that Ukraine's Putin-endorsed President
Viktor Yanukovych headed a corrupt puppet regime
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-

-

-

-

The Russian State’s perception that Yanukovych had been ousted in a
thinly-disguised coup d’état
A regional war fought on ethnic lines
The transformation by the United States, European Union and Russia of
a regional war into a superpower proxy-war
The expansionist tendencies of the European Union
The expansionist tendencies of NATO
Russia's historic desire to influence, if not control, its 'near abroad'.
Imperial ambitions persist on the fractious continent of Europe. EastWest buffer states like Ukraine are under the greatest pressure
The capabilities of the SA-11 SAM system (accuracy, reach, etc.)
The 'normalisation' of shoot-downs since the circa 6 April, 2014
commencement of hostilities in Donbass (see Appendix). Although
most of the downed machines were helicopters or ground-attack aircraft,
larger machines, like the twin-engined Antonov 30 and four-engined
Ilyushin 76 strategic transport, were also destroyed (Dutch Safety
Board, 2015a). Whoever fired the missile(s) may have mistaken the
Boeing 777 for a military jet transport
Airway L980. MH17’s off-centreline position (the aircraft had drifted
3.6 nautical miles north of airway L980's centreline) (Dutch Safety
Board, 2015a) may have looked suspicious to a SAM missile crew
(although off-centreline deviations for weather are not uncommon)
The shrapnel ejected when the SA-11's warhead exploded in proximity
to the Boeing 777
The vulnerability of modern, pressurised aircraft like the Boeing 777 to
shrapnel (Dutch Safety Board, 2015a)
Governments’ willingness to permit overflights of contested territory.
The Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 14) notes: “In diplomatic circles,
concerns were expressed about the [2014] armed conflict in the eastern
part of Ukraine, and the shooting down of military aircraft …. However,
none of the politicians, officials or services made a connection between
the military developments in the region and the possible risks posed to
overflying civil aeroplanes”. Following the disaster, Malaysia’s
Transport Minister said: “[S]ince [Airway L980] is an approved route,
it is safe” (Lai as cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014). Following the MH17
disaster, airlines may wish to reconsider how they read/interpret an
‘official approval’
Airlines' willingness to overfly contested territory. Rietsema (as cited in
Halsey, 2014) claims: “Airliners overfly conflicted areas all the time”.
According to the Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 16), “In March 2014 …
one operator decided not to use the airspace above Ukraine ….
Thereafter, as far as the Dutch Safety Board was able to ascertain, no
other operators changed their flight routes … ”. However, according to
Neate and Glenza (2014), prior to the Flight MH17 disaster, five airlines

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

7

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

-

-

-

-

(British Airways, Qantas, Cathay Pacific, Korean Air Lines and China
Airlines) stopped transiting eastern Ukraine
Malaysia Airlines's risk perception and risk calculation in the context of
its post-MH370 cost-cutting policy. Malaysia Airlines’s "high cost
base" saw it "bleeding cash" even before the loss of Flight MH370 (Daga
& Ngui, 2014). In the three years before the MH17 disaster, Malaysia
had a negative operating cash flow: the carrier was unable to generate
sufficient income to cover its day-to-day operating costs (Daga & Ngui,
2014; Hodgson, Al Haddad, Al Zaabi & Abdulrahim, 2015). According
to the Dutch Safety Board (2015b, p. 15) “[Malaysia Airlines] did not
perform any separate risk assessment for flying over the conflict area in
the eastern part of Ukraine”
Pilots’ mores. Although a Captain can refuse to fly a route s/he considers
unsafe, pilots’ decisions balance several considerations, including the
need to maximise operational efficiency. Captains know that diversions
increase fuel costs and disrupt tightly-coupled timetables. Waste is
anathema to an industry with “very low profit margins” (Quintana as
cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014). Cook (2000, p. 2) notes of those who
make decisions in complex, risk-laden production systems: “[S]ystem
practitioners operate the system in order to produce its desired product
and also work to forestall accidents. This dynamic quality of system
operation, the balancing of demands for production against the
possibility of incipient failure is unavoidable. Outsiders rarely
acknowledge the duality of this role … [T]he outsider’s view
misapprehends the operator’s constant, simultaneous engagement with
both roles [my emphasis]”. Bodies that promote the industry to the
public paint a different picture. Following the disaster, the CEO of the
International Air Transport Association (IATA) claimed: “No airline
will risk the safety of their passengers, crew and aircraft for the sake of
fuel savings” (Tyler as cited in Neate & Glenza, 2014)
The policies of supra-national bodies like the International Civil
Aviation Organisation (ICAO), Eurocontrol and the European Civil
Aviation Conference (ECAC) that countenance commercial flights over
conflict zones. Such bodies rely on sovereign states (like Ukraine) to
produce airspace risk-assessments. In its final report the Dutch Safety
Board (2015a) urged greater caution in the matter of airspace
management in times of crisis
The risk-assessments of the State Aviation Authority of Ukraine and the
Ukrainian State Air Traffic Service Enterprise that deemed it safe for
commercial aircraft to transit the Donbass region at altitudes above
32,000 feet (MH17 met its fate at 33,000 feet), despite the fact that “two
of [Ukraine’s] military aircraft had been shot down at altitudes between
6,200 and 6,500 metres [20,300 – 21,300 ft.] with powerful weapon
systems [my emphasis]” (Dutch Safety Board, 2015b, p. 15). The
Chairman of the United Kingdom Flight Safety Committee (UKFSC)
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-

-

-

notes: “MH17 was in airspace approved by ICAO. Its flight plan was
approved by the Ukrainian authorities, as well as Eurocontrol” (Brady,
2014)
The failure of national and supra-national regulatory authorities to learn
from past events, like the 1983 destruction by a Soviet Su-15 fighter of
Korean Air Lines Flight KAL007, or 1988 destruction by a shiplaunched missile of Iran Air Flight IR655. In both cases, commercial
airliners were routed near or over known troublespots. Viewed through
Toft’s (1992) isomorphic learning prism, the KAL007 and IR655 shootdowns created a space for active learning
The Flexible Use of Airspace concept, which holds that “airspace should
no longer be designated as military or civil airspace, but should be
considered as one continuum” (Eurocontrol, 2014)
The shareholder agenda (maximise profit and dividend)
The passenger agenda (generally to pay as little as possible for a ticket)
The conscious post-1970s engineering of a liberalised and highly
competitive global aviation system (Zellner & Rothman, 1992; Crandall,
2008). Robert Crandall, CEO of American Airlines, argued that aviation
is “intensely, vigorously, bitterly, savagely competitive” (Crandall as
cited in Sherman & Chaganti, 1998, p. 93). He observed: “American’s
[American Airlines’s] success depends on moving quickly from one
advantage to the next” (Crandall as cited in Sherman & Chaganti, 1998,
p. 93)
The difficulty of consistently making a profit in such a volatile industry.
Commercial aviation is plagued by upswing and downswing (Petzinger,
1995)
The aviation system's cost-reduction culture. Cost reduction is a key
objective of most airlines (Lawton, 2002; Massachusetts Institute of
Technology, 2011; Franke & John, 2011). Today, even state-subsidised
airlines are expected to pare down costs (Kennedy, 2015)

Viewed through a systems-thinking lens, the actions of the SAM missile
crew were but one element of a complex of failures (like allowing commercial
aircraft to overfly war zones where protagonists possess advanced anti-air
weaponry). With reference to Turner's (1978) six-stage model of failure we can
see that the incubation period for the disaster stretched back to (at least) the
Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945.
The aviation system actant-component of the MH17 disaster
Systems-thinking argues that the origins of disaster are complex and
messy. "[I]t is better to think of a problem of understanding disasters as a 'sociotechnical' problem with social organization and technical processes interacting
to produce the phenomena to be studied” says Turner (1978, p. 3). Further, in
an open system there are n routes to disaster: “[S]ystems theory predicts that
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any open system … can arrive at a given end state … via different routes” (Toft,
1996, p. 103). This peculiarity of system behaviour is known as equifinality.
The behaviour of the aviation system contributed to the loss of MH17.
It was a systems accident (see Reason (2013) for a definition of ‘systems
accident’), the causes of which included both an error of judgement – a missile
crew mistaking Malaysia’s 777-200 for a hostile aircraft – and policy decisions,
including Ukraine’s decision to allow passenger aircraft to overfly a war-zone
and Malaysia Airlines’s decision to take advantage of the Ukrainian authorities’
concession. The origins of the MH17 disaster are to be found in the commercial
aviation network-space (see table above). With reference to Turner’s (1978;
1994) work on incubation and system vulnerability, and Reason’s (1990) work
on latent conditions (resident pathogens), the commercial aviation networkspace (governments, regulatory authorities, airlines, shareholders, customers,
etc.) incubated the MH17 disaster until, on 17 July, 2014, a missile crew added
Turner’s ‘trigger event’ and Reason’s ‘active failure’.
Attributing the disaster solely to a missile crew’s error of judgement is
too simplistic. The causes of the MH17 disaster lie not only with the decision to
fire the missile(s), but also with the politics, economics and risk calculations of
the aviation system’s component parts. Specifically, in the agendas of its
regulatory agencies, air navigation service providers, airlines, customers and
investors. It was the aviation system that put MH17 in contested airspace. It was
the aviation system that exposed MH17’s 298 passengers and crew to the risk
of shoot-down. The launching of the missile(s) was just one of a number of
errors-of-judgement that brought down the 777. Had MH17 not been in eastern
Ukraine it would not have been shot down. Had the aviation system internalised
the lessons of past incidents and accidents, it probably would not have allowed
flights through contested airspace. Systems-thinking, which finds expression in
Toft’s theory of passive and active learning (Toft, 1992; Toft & Reynolds,
1997), encourages us to think of past events not as footnotes in the historical
record but as potentially life-saving learning opportunities. Passive learning
describes a situation where there is knowledge but no remediation. Active
learning where there is remediation.
The passive learning actant-component of the disaster
Lagadec (1982, p. 495) observed: “The disaster must not be seen like a
meteorite that falls out of the sky on an innocent world; the disaster, most often,
is anticipated, and on multiple occasions”. Most often, disasters are foretold.
This is certainly the case with that type of aviation disaster known as the shootdown. Speaking about the loss of MH17, the Chief Executive of the United
Kingdom Flight Safety Committee (UKFSC) claimed: “The previously
unthinkable has happened” (Whittingham, 2014). In fact, the destruction of
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MH17 was far from unthinkable. Rather, it ‘was anticipated, and on multiple
occasions’. Harbingers included the following losses and near-misses:
The destruction of Flight KAL007. In September 1983, a Soviet Su15 fighter shot down a Korean Air Lines Boeing 747. Flight KAL007, en route
from Anchorage to Seoul and carrying 269 passengers and crew, strayed into
Soviet airspace around the time of a U.S. military reconnaissance sortie.
KAL007 was at 35,000 feet when the Su-15’s missile hit. The Soviets initially
denied responsibility. KAL007’s flight-plan saw it skirt some of the Soviet
Union’s most sensitive military installations, specifically those on Sakhalin
Island and the Kamchatka Peninsula (Johnson, 1986). Although not war-zones,
Sakhalin and Kamchatka were hot-zones that should not have been overflown.
The Soviets claimed that KAL007 “flew deep into Soviet territory for several
hundred kilometres, without responding to signals [radio calls] and disobeying
the orders of interceptor[s]” (Sputnik, 1983). It is possible that wider events,
like Reagan’s tub-thumping rhetoric (Ambrose, 1985; Johnson, 1986; Troy,
2009), the US deployment of Pershing II missiles to Europe and NATO’s
imminent Exercise Able Archer, skewed perceptions of KAL007, increasing the
likelihood of a shoot-down. The cultural milieu (composed of myriad events of
diverse nature) shapes perceptions (Douglas & Wildavsky, 1982). Our beliefs,
experiences, prejudices and memories – concentrated in cognitive 'short-cuts'
called heuristics – influence how we interpret and react to objective reality
(Williams, 2007). Heuristics have positive and negative aspects. On the plus
side they speed information processing. They are ‘fast and frugal’ (Gigerenzer,
Todd & The ABC Research Group, 1999). On the minus side they can cause us
to misinterpret signals. Misinterpretation may have severe consequences for
both subject and object: “[Heuristics] can lead to severe and systematic biases
that influence the search for information and subsequent interpretations, often
resulting in less rational … decision-making. This is particularly pertinent when
making … uncertain or risky decisions” (Williams, 2007, p. 45). Less rational
decision-making is especially problematic in life-or-death situations, as when a
missile crew has to interpret a radar plot, or a fighter pilot has to determine an
aircraft's intentions.
The destruction of Flight IR655. In 1988, a missile fired from the USS
Vincennes brought down an Iran Air A300 Airbus en route from Tehran to
Dubai. All 290 passengers and crew were killed. The aircraft was intercepted in
Iranian airspace over the Strait of Hormuz. Prior to the shoot-down, there had
been a confrontation between Iranian small boats and the Vincennes’s
helicopter. The shoot-down occurred in the context of the long-running IranIraq war (that saw the United States favour Iraq), attacks on United States
warships and attacks on commercial vessels transiting the Strait. These events
may have persuaded the USS Vincennes’s crew that they were watching a
military aircraft flying an attack profile rather than a civilian aircraft navigating
an airway. Crewmembers said they believed they were tracking an Iranian F14
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Tomcat fighter (Bennett, 2001). Events shape perceptions. In hindsight,
regional aviation authorities should have diverted aircraft around the Strait of
Hormuz hot-zone.
The destruction of Flight SB1812. In 2001, Siberia Airlines Flight
1812 was destroyed by an errant Ukrainian surface-to-air missile. The missile,
fired during a military exercise, is thought to have overshot a target drone. It
exploded close to the TU-154M. Seventy-eight passengers and crew perished.
Following this incident, Ukraine reportedly banned the testing of such systems
for a period of seven years. Flight 1812, from Tel Aviv to Novosibirsk, was
intercepted at an altitude of 36,000 feet. Some Russian commentators
interpreted the MH17 disaster through the lens of the 2001 Siberia Airlines
shoot-down. By reminding the public of the 2001 Siberia Airlines Flight
SB1812 shoot-down, commentators were able to present the MH17 disaster as
an example of passive learning.
The near-destruction of European Air Transport (EAT) Airbus OODLL. In 2003, a EAT Airbus cargo aircraft departing Baghdad International
was hit by a short-range man-portable 9K34 Strela-3 (SA-14 Gremlin) missile
at about 8,000 feet. With all flight controls disabled and the aircraft on fire, the
three-person crew used asymmetric thrust to land the aircraft.
The three shoot-downs were system accidents. While those who pushed
the firing button were the instigators, it was the aviation system (see Figure 1)
that placed the aircraft in jeopardy. Each and every component of the aviation
system was in some way implicated in the shoot-downs. Had those aircraft not
been overflying hot or live-firing zones, they would not have been destroyed.
A systems-thinking interpretation of the KAL007, IR655, Flight 1812
and MH17 shoot-downs suggests that risk-taking is an emergent property of an
aviation system predicated on free-market competition and associated profitseeking behaviours. Other things being equal, the shorter an airliner’s route, the
more profitable the service. Perforce, airline managers must strike a balance
between two imperatives – safety and profit (International Civil Aviation
Organisation, 2002; Bennett, 2014a). Seen through Hollnagel’s (2009)
efficiency-thoroughness trade-off (ETTO) prism, the behaviour of the aviation
industry network-space is unexceptional. An aviation industry that was
excessively risk-averse or excessively risk-seeking would flounder. Aviation
wrestles with numerous difficult operational questions, including: ‘How much
involuntary risk should passengers bear?’ Such questions have ethical and
economic dimensions. As Cook (2000) notes, those who manage complex
production systems (like commercial aviation) devote considerable energies to
balancing production and safety goals in an uncertain and unforgiving
environment.
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Political and press reaction to the MH17 disaster
Politicians’ analysis of the MH17 disaster was generally reductionist
and blamist. Kiev blamed Moscow. Moscow blamed Kiev. Russian President
Vladimir Putin commented: “The government over whose territory it occurred
is responsible for this terrible tragedy” (as cited in Stout, 2014). Surveying
Western reaction, Dejevsky (2014) alleged a “rush to judgement”, citing
Swedish Foreign Minister Carl Bildt’s account: “Bildt may have been arguing
in good faith, but his script was peppered with weasel words and phrases, such
as ‘clearly’ and ‘there is little doubt’, that allowed assumption to masquerade as
fact” (Dejevsky, 2014). Official communiques were more inflammatory than
analytical.
Media analysis was generally reductionist and blamist: “In all, the statealigned and state-owned Russian media coverage of the disaster carrie[d] a
conspiratorial, anti-Western tone, pointing to the Ukrainian government as the
party at fault and Washington as a puppet master” (Yablokov, 2014). In her
analysis of media reporting of the MH17 disaster, Oates (2014) investigated
how two news outlets, Vremya, “the flagship news program on the state-run
First Channel in Russia” (Oates, 2014, p. 1), and BBC Online, “one of the most
popular worldwide news sites” (Oates, 2014, p. 1) reported the story. According
to Oates, coverage generally concerned itself with the question of who shot the
777 down. She observed of the BBC's coverage: “Little blame attached to
Malaysia Airlines for flying through a conflict zone; the airline was primarily
framed as a victim” (Oates, 2014, p. 12). Coverage had an 'episodic rather than
thematic' flavour, said Oates. The question of who pulled the trigger dominated.
According to Koshkin (2014), media coverage amounted to nothing more than
a one-dimensional blizzard of unsupported claim and counter-claim. The
unedifying and noisy argument that accompanied the destruction of Malaysia
Airlines Flight MH17 is unsurprising given that, as Iyengar (1991) notes,
conflicts and disasters generally foment coverage that is episodic and trite.
Following publication by the Dutch Safety Board on October 13, 2015,
of its final report into the MH17 disaster, the war of words between Ukraine and
Russia continued. On the Russian side, the company that manufactured the SA11 Gadfly claimed that the Malaysia Airlines 777 had been destroyed by a SAM
launched from Ukrainian-held territory: "Two full-scale experiments by the
Almaz-Antey defence company aimed at recreating the MH17 crash conclude
the missile that downed the flight was an old BUK model fired from a Ukrainecontrolled area ... " (RT.COM, 2015). Russia’s deputy foreign minister
impugned the integrity of the Dutch Safety Board, calling its final report an
“attempt to draw a biased conclusion and carry out political orders” (Ryabkov
as cited in Yeatman, 2015). On the Ukrainian side, Arseny Yatseniuk, Ukraine’s
Prime Minister, blamed Russian soldiers (possibly aided and abetted by
‘drunken’ separatists) for the downing: "In our opinion it was carried out solely
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from territory controlled by Russian fighters .... [T]here is no doubt that drunken
separatists are not able to operate Buk systems .... [T]his means these systems
were operated solely by professional Russian soldiers" (Yatseniuk as cited in
EurActiv, 2015).
Blamism revisited
On 24 March, 2015, a Germanwings First Officer dived his Airbus
passenger aircraft into a mountain, killing all on board (Bureau d'Enquêtes et
d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile, 2015). Lubitz used the Airbus
aircraft to commit suicide (Bennett, 2015c). When details of Andreas Lubitz’s
medical history began to emerge, much of the press rounded on the pilot. In
Britain, front-page headlines from 28 March, 2015 included:
Table 1
British tabloid and broadsheet reporting of the Flight 4U9525 disaster.
The Guardian

A picture emerges of a man disturbed and ill. Yet
allowed to fly.
The Times
Killer pilot ‘had made plans to go down in history’.
Girlfriend was scared of his erratic behaviour.
The Daily Telegraph
Doctor had ordered killer pilot to stay off work on
day of disaster
The Independent
Pilot ‘had a sick note’ for day he killed 149 people
Financial
Times Co-pilot destroyed sick note declaring him unfit to
Weekend
fly
i on Saturday
Co-pilot hid illness from his employers
Daily Express
Death crash pilot was depressed and ripped up his
sick notes
The Sun
Kill pilot tore up flight-day sicknote
Daily Star
Killer pilot’s secret gay torment

In failing to reference the broader context to the disaster (pilot indebtedness,
roster volatility, the possibility of roster-induced acute and chronic fatigue, the
potential for operations in congested airspace to induce stress, some pilots’
belief that reporting sick may be viewed with suspicion, etc. (Bennett, 2014a,
2015c)) the press again committed the fundamental attribution error. By
focusing on the First Officer rather than the industry, the Fourth Estate
distracted attention from potentially relevant factors like pilots’ deteriorating
employment conditions (Bennett, 2014a, 2015b). Here we have further evidence
for the need to propagate the systems-thinking approach to accident
investigation.
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Conclusion
As an antidote to the blizzard of recrimination that followed the
Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 disaster, and to reduce the risk of recurrence,
this paper has presented a systems-thinking-informed analysis (specifically an
actor-network theory-informed analysis). Actor-network theory teases out the
interactive complexity, relationality, latent and emergent properties of complex
socio-technical systems like that which supplies commercial air service across
international borders. The theory of emergence holds that systems phenomena
like
positive
synergy,
negative
synergy,
incomprehensibility,
miscommunication and non-linear interactions may cause complex sociotechnical systems (for example, the system that provides commercial air service
across international borders) to behave in unexpected ways. The paper suggests
that on 17 July, 2014, unexpected and risky behaviours within the European
commercial aviation network-space led to the destruction over Hrabove,
Ukraine, of Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17. Several of the systemic origins of
the Flight MH17 disaster were highlighted in the Dutch Safety Board’s (2015a)
final report. Amongst other suggestions, the Board urged a more cautious
approach to airspace management and utilisation in times of conflict. According
to the Board, the current ‘default’ position of states and airlines is that flight is
always possible: “The international system for civil aviation is based on the
assumption that, in principle, civil aviation is always possible …. This system
can provide an incentive to keep … airspace open if potential dangers to air
traffic are not yet entirely clear. Flying is also the default for operators” (Dutch
Safety Board, 2015a, p. 250). During crisis or conflict, aviation’s ‘default
position’ may be considered a latent error.
The paper suggests that in the aftermath of the MH17 disaster, blamism
served identifiable political ends for actors like the Russian Federation,
Ukraine’s warring militias, the United States, the European Union, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), national and international regulatory
agencies, air navigation service providers (ANSPs) and the airline industry.
Following Russia’s annexation of the Crimea, the West has used MH17 to frame
Russia as a paranoid and unpredictable state, and President Putin as a loose
cannon whose geopolitical ambitions induce him to promote disaffection with
Western values and provide material support to regimes with dubious human
rights records (Bashr Al-Assad’s Syria, for example). Russia’s revamped
Middle East policy, which in the Autumn of 2015 saw it launch air strikes in
support of Syria’s President Bashr Al-Assad (Greene, 2015), would seem to
confirm the West’s reading of Putin’s politics. The East has used it to frame the
USA and the European Union as expansionist powers with designs on Russia’s
near abroad. The Russians construct NATO as the armed wing of Western
imperialism. NATO is Russia’s bête noire.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

15

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

The paper argues that in the context of systems accidents like the
destruction of Flight MH17 (and the loss of Germanwings Flight 4U9525),
blamism serves to distract attention from the broader systemic origins of
disaster. The paper argues that only systems-thinking-informed deconstructions
of incidents, accidents and near-misses can provide the sort of fine-grained,
nuanced analysis essential for effective and durable mitigations. As Gherardi
and Nicolini (2000) explain, safety is an emergent property of the actornetwork. Safety emerges as “the outcome of the quotidian engineering of
heterogeneous elements: competencies, materials, relations, communications,
and people that are integral to the work practices” (Gherardi and Nicolini, 2000,
p. 11).
It is hoped that the philosophy and practice of systems-thinking
(grounded in reflective practice) will appeal to those actors - politicians, civil
servants and warfighters - who have a direct and immediate influence over our
lives. Realistically this will not happen when simplistic reductionist analyses of
disasters like Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 and Germanwings Flight 4U9525
provide antagonists with easy political capital. If politicians can bring
themselves to see disasters not as a means of furthering some political ambition,
but as learning opportunities, the world will become safer. Unfortunately, like
KAL007, MH17 has become a political football. The Great Game is afoot, with
truth its victim.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

16

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

References
Ambrose, S.E. (1985). Rise to globalism (3rd ed.). New York: Penguin.
Aviation Safety Network. (2014). Aviation Safety Network – Flight Safety
Foundation. Retrieved from http://aviationsafety.net/wikibase/dblist.php?Country=UR&page=1
Bennett, S.A. (2001). Not context-contexts: An 'outside-in' Approach to
understanding the Vincennes shoot-down. International Journal of Mass
Emergencies and Disasters, 19(1), 27–57.
Bennett, S.A. (2014a). How pilots live: An examination of the lifestyle of
commercial pilots. Oxford, UK: Peter Lang International Academic
Publishers.
Bennett, S.A. (2014b). Ideology and greed at root of ebola crisis. The
Leicester Mercury, October 31.
Bennett, S.A. (2015a). Let’s take the glamour out of guns – they kill. The
Leicester Mercury, January 8.
Bennett, S.A. (2015b). Air disaster media frenzy is shameful. The Leicester
Mercury, April 1.
Bennett, S.A. (2015c). Avoiding ‘blamism’. Air International, August, 50-51.
Black, J., & Koopman, P. (2009). System safety as an emergent property in
composite systems. Pittsburgh, PA.: Carnegie Mellon University.
Blair, D. (2015). How do we protect the Baltic States? The Daily Telegraph,
February 19.
Brady, C. (2014). Safe skies? Focus on Commercial Aviation Safety, Autumn.
British Broadcasting Corporation (2015). Ukraine conflict: US tanks in Baltics
as NATO drills start. Retrieved from http://www.bbc.co.uk/
Browning, L.D., & Shetler, J.C. (1992). Communication in crisis,
communication in recovery: A postmodern commentary on the Exxon
Valdez disaster. International Journal of Mass Emergencies and Disasters,
10(3), 477–498. doi:10.1080/10510979209368359

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

17

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

Bureau d'Enquêtes et d'Analyses pour la sécurité de l'aviation civile (2015).
Accident to the Airbus A320-211 registered D-AIPX, flight GWI18G, on 24
March 2015. Retrieved from http://www.bea.aero/
Callon, M. (1991). Techno-economic networks and irreversibility. In J. Law
(Ed.) A sociology of monsters: essays on power, technology and
domination (pp. 132–161). London: Routledge.
Callon, M., & Latour, B. (1981). Unscrewing the big leviathan: How actors
macro-structure reality and how sociologist help them to do so. In K.
Knorr-Cetina & A.V. Cicouvel (Eds.) Advances in Social Theory and
Methodology: Towards an Integration of Micro and Macro-Sociology (pp.
277–303). London: Routledge.
Callon, M., & Law, J. (1997). After the individual in society: Lessons on
collectivity from science, technology and society. Canadian Journal of
Sociology, 22(2), 165–182. doi: 10.2307/3341747
Cook, R.I. (2000). How complex systems fail. Chicago, Il.: Cognitive
Technologies Laboratory, University of Chicago.
Crandall, R.L. (2008). Remarks of Robert L. Crandall, The Wings Club.
Retrieved from http://www.wingsclub.org/
Daga, A., & Ngui, Y. (2014). Struggling Malaysian Airline may need
government bailout. Retrieved from
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/25/us-malaysia-airlines-financingidUSBREA2O1U420140325.
Dejevsky, M. (2014). MH17 blame-game reflects badly on all of us. The
Spectator. Retrieved from http://blogs.spectator.co.uk/coffeehouse/
2014/07/the-rush-to-place-blame-in-the-aftermath-of-mh17-has-been-acredit-to-no-one/
Dekker, S. (2006). Resilience Engineering: Chronicling the Emergence of
Confused Consensus. In E. Hollnagel, D.D. Woods & N. Leveson (Eds.)
Resilience engineering: concepts and precepts (pp. 77–92). Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Deutsche Welle. (2014, November 10). Doors sealed shut as Merkel receives
Gorbachev. Chancellor Merkel has met with former Soviet leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, one of the players in the diplomatic drama that led to German
unity 25 years ago. Now a new conflict is threatening ties between East and
West. Deutsche Welle. Retrieved from http://www.dw.de/doors-sealedshut-as-merkel-receives-gorbachev/a-18055222.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

18

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

Dorner, D. (1996). The Logic of Failure: Recognizing and Avoiding Error in
Complex Situations. Cambridge, MA.: Perseus Books.
Douglas, M., & Wildavsky, A. (1982). Risk and culture: an analysis of the
selection of technological dangers. Berkley, CA: University of California
Press.
Dutch Safety Board. (2014). Preliminary report. Crash involving Malaysia
Airlines Boeing 777-200 flight MH17, Hrabove, Ukraine – 17 July, 2014.
The Hague, Nethrelands: Dutch Safety Board.
Dutch Safety Board. (2015a). Crash of Malaysia Airlines flight MH17,
Hrabove, Ukraine, 17 July, 2014. The Hague, The Netherlands: Dutch
Safety Board.
Dutch Safety Board. (2015b). MH17 Crash. The Hague, The Netherlands:
Dutch Safety Board.
EurActiv (2015). Ukrainian PM accuses Russia of shooting down flight
MH17. Retrieved from http://www.euractiv.com/sections/globaleurope/ukrainian-pm-accuses-russia shooting-down-flight-mh17-318462.
Eurocontrol. (2014). Flexible use of airspace. Retrieved from
http://www.eurocontrol.int/articles/flexible-use-airspace.
Fiske, S., & Taylor, S. (1984). Social cognition. New York: Random House.
Franke, M., & John, F. (2011). What comes next after recession? – Airline
industry scenarios and potential end games. Journal of Air Transport
Management, 17(1), 19–26. doi: 10.1016/j.jairtraman.2010.10.005
Garton-Ash, T. (2014, July 18). Putin’s deadly doctrine. The New York Times.
Gherardi, S., & Nicolini, D. (2000). The organizational learning of safety in
communities of practice. Journal of Management Inquiry, 9 (1), 7–18.
doi: 10.1177/105649260091002
Gigerenzer, G., Todd, P.M., & The ABC Research Group. (1999). Simple
heuristics that make us smart. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
Greene, S. (2015, October 2) Watch What Putin Does, Not What He Says:
Nothing in the Russian president’s UN speech suggested he was about to
bomb Syria or withdraw from Ukraine. But that’s what he did. The Atlantic.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

19

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

Gregory, P.R. (2014). Russia uses semantics to walk back recognition of
Donbass elections before G20 Summit. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/paulroderickgregory/2014/11/08/russia-usessemantics-to-walk-back-recognition-of-donbass-elections-before-g20summit.
Griffin, T.G.C., Young, M.S. & Stanton, N.A. (2015) Human factors models
for aviation accident analysis and prevention. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd.
Haddon-Cave, C. (2009). The Nimrod Review. An independent review into the
broader issues surrounding the loss of the RAF Nimrod MR2 Aircraft
XV230 in Afghanistan in 2006. HC 1025. London: Her Majesty's Stationery
Office.
Halsey, A. (2014). Airlines often use eastern Ukraine route. Retrieved from
http://www.post-gazette.com/news/world/2014/07/18/Airlines-often-useeastern-Ukraine-route/stories/201407180097.
Hodgson, S., Al Haddad, M., Al Zaabi, S., & Abdulrahim, S. (2015). MH17:
Did safety come first? Middle East Journal of Business, 10(1), 27–38.
Hollnagel, E. (2004). Barriers and accident prevention. Aldershot, UK:
Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Hollnagel, E. (2009). The ETTO principle: Efficiency-thoroughness trade-off.
Why things that go right sometimes go wrong. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate
Publishing Ltd.
Horlick-Jones, T. (1996). The problem of blame. In C. Hood & T. HorlickJones (Eds.) Accident and design. Contemporary debates in risk
management (pp. 61–71). London: UCL Press.
International Civil Aviation Organisation. (1995). Six years after the Dryden
tragedy, many accident investigation authorities have learned its lessons.
International Civil Aviation Organisation Journal, 50(8), 20–25.
International Civil Aviation Organisation. (2002.) Line operations safety audit
(LOSA). Montreal, Canada: International Civil Aviation Organisation.
International Civil Aviation Organisation. (2013). Safety management manual
(3rd ed.). Montreal, Canada: International Civil Aviation Organisation.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

20

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

Iyengar, S. (1991). Is anyone responsible? How television frames political
issues. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Jane's Publishing. (2011). Jane's land-based air defence 2011-2012.
Coulsdon, UK: Jane's Publishing.
Jeffcott, S., Pidgeon, N., Weyman, A., & Walls, J. (2006). Risk, trust and
safety culture in U.K. train operating companies. Risk Analysis, 26(5),
1105–1121. doi: 10.1111/j.1539-6924.2006.00819.x
Johnson, C.W. (2005). What are emergent properties and how do they affect
the engineering of complex systems? Glasgow, UK: Department of
Computing Science, University of Glasgow.
Johnson, R.W. (1986). Shootdown. The verdict on KAL007. London: Book
Club Associates.
Kennedy, C. (2015). A350 XWB maiden service, Aviation News, March.
Koshkin, P. (2014, July 21). The media battle over MH17: The Kremlin vs.
the world. Russia Direct.
Kuchins, A.C. (2015). Russia and the CIS in 2014. Asian Survey, 55(1), 148–
156. doi: 10.1525/as.2014.54.1.129
Lagadec, P. (1982). Major technical risk: An assessment of industrial
disasters. Oxford, UK: Pergamon Press.
Lawton, T.C. (2002). Cleared for take-Off. Structure and strategy in the lowfare airline business. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Levada Centre. (2014). Levada - Centre and KIIS about crisis in Ukraine.
Retrieved from http://www.levada.ru/eng/levada-center-and-kiis-aboutcrisis-ukraine.
Levgold, R. (2014). Managing the new Cold War. What Moscow and
Washington can learn from the last one. Foreign Affairs, July/August.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology. (2011). Airline industry overview.
Retrieved from http://mit.edu/airlines.
Maurino, D.E., Reason, J., Johnston, N. & Lee, R.B. (1998). Beyond aviation
human factors. Aldersho, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

21

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

Miller, K.D. (2009). Organisational Risk after Modernism. Organisation
Studies. 30(2-3), 157–180. doi: 10.1177/0170840608101475
Moshansky, V.P. (1992). Commission of inquiry into the Air Ontario crash at
Dryden, Ontario. Toronto, Canada: Government of Canada.
Murdoch, J. (1997). Towards a geography of heterogeneous associations.
Progress in Human Geography, 21(3), 321–337.
doi: 10.1191/030913297668007261
Neate, R., & Glenza, J. (2014, July 18). Many airlines have avoided
Ukrainian airspace for months. The Guardian.
Oates, S. (2014). Russian state narrative in the digital age: Rewired
propaganda in Russian television news framing of Malaysia Airlines Flight
17. Paper prepared for the American Political Science Association Annual
Meeting (Political Communication Pre-Conference at George Washington
University). Washington, D.C. Retrieved from http://www.mediapolitics.com/presentationspublications.htm.
Petzinger, T. (1995). Hard Landing. How the Epic Contest for Power and
Profits Plunged the Airlines into Chaos. London: Aurum.
Rasmussen, J. (1997). Risk management in a dynamic society: a modelling
problem. Safety Science, 27, 183–213.
doi: 10.1016/s0925-7535(97)00052-0
Reason, J. (1990). Human Error. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University
Press.
Reason, J. (1997). Managing the risks of organisational accidents. Aldershot,
UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Reason, J. (2008). The human contribution: Unsafe acts, accidents and heroic
recoveries. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Reason, J. (2013). A Life in Error. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Reason, J., & Hobbs, A. (2003). Managing maintenance error: A practical
guide. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Risan, L.C. (1997). Artificial life: A technoscience leaving modernity? An
anthropology of subjects and objects. Retrieved from
http://www.anthrobase.com/Txt/R/Risan_L_05.htm.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

22

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

RT.COM (2015) MH17 downed by outdated BUK missile fired from Kievcontrolled area – Defence system manufacturer. Retrieved from
https://www.rt.com/news/318531-mh17-experiment-almaz-antey.
Sherman, H., & Chaganti, R. (1998). Corporate governance and the
timelessness of change. Westport, CT: Quorum Books.
Shorrock, S., Leonhardt, J., Licu, T., & Peters, C. (2014). Systems thinking for
safety: Ten principles. Brussels, Belgium: Eurocontrol.
Sputnik. (1983). The truth and lies about the South Korean airliner. Sputnik: A
Digest of the Soviet Press, December.
Stout, D. (2014, July 18). Putin: If MH17 Crashed in Ukraine, It’s Ukraine’s
fault. Time Magazine.
Tochen, D., & Tobin, T.W. (2013). The anatomy of an NTSB accident
investigation: A guide for 'Parties-to-the-Investigation' and their lawyers.
White Plains, NY: Wilson Elser.
Toft, B. (1992). The Failure of Hindsight. Disaster Prevention and
Management: An International Journal, 1(3), 48–63.
doi: 10.1108/09653569210018690
Toft, B. (1996). Limits to the mathematical modelling of disasters. In C. Hood
& D.K.C. Jones (Eds.) Accident and Design (pp. 99–110). London: UCL
Press.
Toft, B., & Reynolds, S. (1997). Learning from disasters. Leicester, UK:
Perpetuity Press.
Troy, G. (2009). The Reagan revolution. Oxford, UK: Oxford University
Press.
Turner, B.A. (1978). Man-made Disasters. London: Wykeham.
Turner, B.A. (1994). Causes of Disaster, sloppy management. British Journal
of Management, 5(3), 215–219. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-8551.1994.tb00172.x
Usborne, D. (2015, October 2). Syria’s perfect storm: Iran and Russia fight to
prop up Assad. The i-Newspaper.
Weir, D.T.H. (1996). Risk and disaster: the role of communications
breakdown in plane crashes and business failure. In C. Hood & D.K.C.
Jones (Eds.) Accident and Design (pp. 114-126). London: UCL Press.

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

23

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

Whittingham, D. (2014). Rockets and risk. Focus on Commercial Aviation
Safety, Autumn.
Williams, D.J. (2007). Risk and decision-making. In M. Cook, J. Noyes & Y.
Masakowski (Eds.) Decision-Making in Complex Environments (pp. 4354). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Wintour P., & Doherty, B. (2014). Vladimir Putin leaves G20 after leaders
line up to browbeat him over Ukraine. Russian president says he’s leaving
early to get some sleep after long meetings in which he refused to give
ground. Retrieved from
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/nov/16/vladimir-putin-leavesg20-after-leaders-line-up-to-browbeat-him-over-ukraine.
Woods, D.D., Dekker, S., Cook, R., Johannesen, L., & Sarter, N. (2010).
Behind human error (2nd ed.). Aldershot, UK: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.
Yablokov, I. (2014). Russian media coverage of MH17 leaves no room for
dissenting voices. Retrieved from http://emergencyjournalism.net/russianmedia-coverage-of mh17-leaves-no-room-for-dissenting-voices/
Yeatman, D. (2015, October 14). Dutch PM: MH17 missile confirms worst
suspicions. Metro.
Zellner, W., & Rothman, A. (1992). The airline mess. Retrieved from
http://www.businessweek.com/stories/1992-07-05/the-airline-mess.

https://commons.erau.edu/ijaaa/vol2/iss4/4
DOI: https://doi.org/10.15394/ijaaa.2015.1078

24

Bennett: Framing the MH17 disaster – more heat than light?

Appendix

Published by Scholarly Commons, 2015

25

International Journal of Aviation, Aeronautics, and Aerospace, Vol. 2 [2015], Iss. 4, Art. 4

Aircraft destroyed
Date

Aircraft

Specification and Role

16/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1

Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack

16/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1

Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack

14/07/14 Antonov 26

Twin-turboprop transport

12/07/14 Mil Mi-24

Helicopter gunship

02/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25M1

Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack

02/07/14 Sukhoi Su-24

Twin-seat, twin-engined supersonic strike

01/07/14 Sukhoi Su-25UB

Single-seat, twin-engined ground-attack

24/06/14 Mil Mi-8TV

Twin-engined transport helicopter

21/06/14 Mil Mi-8T

Twin-engined transport helicopter

14/06/14 Ilyushin 76MD

Four-jet strategic transport

06/06/14 Antonov 30

Twin-turboprop photographic reconnaissance aircraft

05/06/14 Mil Mi-8

Twin-engined transport helicopter

04/06/14 Mil Mi-24RhR

Helicopter gunship

04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP

Helicopter gunship

04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP

Helicopter gunship

04/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP

Helicopter gunship

03/06/14 Mil Mi-24VP

Helicopter gunship

29/05/14 Mil Mi-8MT

Twin-engined transport helicopter

05/05/14 Mil Mi-24P

Helicopter gunship

02/05/14 Mil Mi-8MT

Twin-engined transport helicopter

02/05/14 Mil Mi-24P

Helicopter gunship

02/05/14 Mil Mi-24P

Helicopter gunship

25/04/14 Mil Mi-8

Twin-engined transport helicopter

22/04/14 Antonov An-30B

Twin-turboprop photographic reconnaissance aircraft

Note: All the above aircraft were operated by the Ukrainian armed forces
Source: Aviation Safety Network (2014)
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